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Governments around the globe are embracing Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) to overcome 
financial and technical deficit and to provide public infrastructure on faster pace. However, 
PPPs are complex institutional arrangements involving many players from diversified fields 
and thus bringing more risk to the project. Numerous researches had been conducted to 
investigate potential risks and success factors for establishing PPPs. But, as appetite for 
transportation PPPs is increasing around the globe, more problems and partnership failures 
are being witnessed. Existence of such failures and faults, despite of the availability of 
scientific protocols, motivate the authors to investigate transportation PPPs failures in past 
two decades. The investigation led to the identification of forty eight potential failure reasons, 
responsible for transportation PPPs. The identification of “potential failure reasons” was 
made possible through thirty five transportation PPPs case studies. The investigation through 
case studies reveals that the adoption of PPPs in different regions was motivated by specific 
reasons besides fundamental financial and technical concerns. These specific reasons had 
played important roles in the project success and failure. This paper discusses the global trend 
of transportation PPPs in different economies with evidence of potential failure reasons and 
their causal relationships. 
 






Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) have been accepted worldwide as an alternative form of 
public infrastructure delivery. In a typical PPP, the private sector brings their capital and technical 
capabilities to accomplish specific public sector infrastructure project in association with related 
public sector agencies, thus sharing the project risks and benefits. The benefits for the private 
sector are usually in the form of toll collected from users of furnished facilities or in the form of 
payments directly from the government or public sector client. The vast global adoption of PPPs 
proven to be an alternative for budgetary constrained governments to acquire necessary public 
infrastructure by exploiting national and international private capitals. Despite of many proven 
successes, the practical experience has shown that establishing PPPs is not as easy as it was 
considered by many governments and thus history is full of hundreds of failure cases representing 
almost every nation and every sector. PPPs are complex institutional arrangements and public and 
private sectors are not the only stakeholders in real. In a typical PPP, the private sector partner is 
backed by financers, usually reputed local or international financial institutes. These financers are 
the main source of capital during facility construction and therefore have quite influence on the 
organizational structure of the project. In most cases, financers reserve the “step in” rights in case 
of private partner’s failure of completion of jobs. Besides financers, the private partner is also 
supported by a bunch of shareholders who provide some share of finance through their equity 
injection. On the other hand, the public partner is also responsible to many other government 
agencies and regulators. For example, in a typical railway PPP project, the public sector may be 
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responsible to the Ministry of Finance for formal approval of the concession scheme, then it 
comes to the local governments for allocation of right of way, and after that it may be the 
approval of designs by a railways regulation authority. Therefore for any government, dealing 
with a PPP project requires a firm institutional capacity in its public sector agencies. That is the 
reason many nations have established independent PPP Units to facilitate and educate public 
sector officials.  
Since the adoption of PPPs as a tool for providing public infrastructure, researchers had 
strived hard to work out rules of conduct for private activities in public business. Ref [1] 
identified six critical success factors (CSFs) in winning BOT contracts: (1) entrepreneurship and 
leadership, (2) right project identification, (3) strength of the consortium, (4) technical solution 
advantage, (5) financial package differentiation, and (6) differentiation in guarantees. This 
approach of identification of potential success factors was succeeded by [2] by broadening the 
scope to other forms of PPPs. Ref [2] identified five CSFs, with sets of sub success factors, for 
infrastructure development PPPs. The five CSFs are (1) favorable investment environment, (2) 
economic viability, (3) reliable concessionaire with strong technical strength, (4) sound financial 
package, and (5) appropriate risk allocation via reliable contractual arrangements. Ref [4] 
identified CSFs for PFI projects in United Kingdom. Besides the CSFs approach, massive 
research had been conducted on other PPP issues. For example, [3] worked out methods and 
criteria for selection of concessionaire, [5] presented a knowledge based approach for PPP 
stakeholder management, and [6] applied alliance principals for better outputs of PPP projects. In 
spite of many successful PPPs in the past two decades, the real practice has witnessed a number of 
flawed and failed PPPs. Even developed economies like UK, USA and Canada has a bitter history 
of bad PPP deals. The existence of such failures motivates the authors to investigate PPP failures 
in the past two decades around the globe in order to identify specific reasons driving PPPs 
towards failure. However, this research is limited to transportation PPPs only. The authors 
identified a set of such potential reasons. During the research it was also disclosed that such 
reasons may not have significant impact unless they occur in a causal relationship with each other. 
This paper discusses the global trend of transportation PPPs in different economies with evidence 
of potential failure reasons and their causal relationships. 
 
Table 1: Types of transportation PPPs failures 
No. Type of failure Definition 
1. Value for Money not achieved 
The public sector was unable to achieve Value for money and tax 
payers suffered losses. 
2. Concession cancelled The concession contract is cancelled by the government and new tendering process is launched. 
3. Concession tender cancelled 
The concession tender call off at initial stages (i.e. before signing 
agreement) due to poor financial viability of project or other 
reason. 
4. Project nationalization 
The government nationalizes the project i.e. the project comes 
under public ownership. 
5. Project Halted The project halts for a long time due to some conflicts, legal proceedings or any technical fault. 
6. Contract suspension The government temporary suspends the concession rights of concessionaire. 
 
 
2.0 WHICH PARTNERSHIP COULD BE RATED AS “FAILURE”? 
 
Before discussing phenomena of partnership failure, it is necessary to understand the reason 
for which private parties are invited to deliver public infrastructure and associated services. The 
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budgetary constraints faced by governments and demands of increased productivity are the basic 
motivations for public sector agencies to invite private parties to form such partnerships. Or 
simply, the anticipation of increased value for money to the tax payer is the reason for adopting 
PPPs. Therefore, it can be concluded that any PPP not delivering value for money can be rated as 
a failed partnership. This paper considers a total of six types of failure, details of which are 
provided in Table 1. A PPP project may fall into more than one type of failure. Table 2 shows the 
frequencies of each failure type observed. 
 
Table 2: Types of failure observed in case study samples 
No. Failure Type Africa Asia Canada CEE  UK USA South America Total 
1 Concession cancelled 2 3 0 4 0 0 1 10 
2 Concession tender cancelled 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 5 
3 Contract suspension 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
4 Nationalization of project 1 2 0 2 4 2 0 11 
5 Project halted 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
6 Value for money not achieved 0 0 2 1 5 0 0 8 
 
 
3.0 SAMPLE PPP FAILURE CASES 
 
3.1. APPROACH TO COLLECTING EVIDENCES FOR CASE STUDIES 
 
Ref [7] defined six basic sources of evidences for conducting case studies: (1) 
documentation, (2) archival records, (3) interviews, (4) direct observations, (5) participant 
observation, and (6) physical artifacts. Typically, PPPs are complex organizational structures 
involving multiple parties and consisting of long spans. It was impossible to perform direct or 
participant observations, and physical artifacts have no application in a PPP process. Therefore, 
the authors majorly had to rely on documentations and archival records. One interview was also 
conducted to collect case information in Pakistan. In collecting evidences, the following types of 
documents and archival records were utilized: 
(1) Administrative documents – proposals, progress reports, publically released information 
(2) Formal studies – research papers, evaluation studies, institution released documents, audit 
reports 
(3) Newspaper clippings and other articles appeared in mass media communications 
(4) Organizational records 
The details of PPP deals are usually kept secret by government officials due to the 
commercial confidentiality; thus all available documents and archival records associated with 
particular projects were lacking of much information. It was rare that one source of evidence 
could provide all necessary information. As PPP details are a matter of confidentiality, it was also 
common that two different documents about one project could illustrate a contradiction in 
information. In this situation the reliance was made upon the source of document information.  
 
 
3.2. PREPARATION OF SAMPLE CASES 
 
The failure case search was initiated from World Bank’s PPI database. The PPI database 
search returned 92 cancelled transportation projects in developing nations. It is the limitation of 
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PPI database that it only keeps record of private activity in developing nations and also has no 
record for projects not delivered value for money. The PPI database also doesn’t keeps record of 
project details that how exactly project went fail. The search for failure cases was extended to 
available literature on web tagged with transportation PPPs. The web search returned with 
thousands of documents. These documents included research papers, evaluation studies made by 
public sector authorities and international financial institute, audit reports and reports by nonprofit 
organizations. Through the piles of documents, thirty five failure cases were finalized for further 
analysis. The selection of each failure case was made after passing each case through the failure 
criteria established above, and availability of firm and reliable documentary proof. The finalized 
failure cases represented many developed and developing nations around the globe. Table 3 
illustrates projects considered for case studies. 
 
Table 3: Projects considered for case studies 
No. Project Name & Country of origin Type of failure 
1 Blegrade Novisad Motorway, Czech Republic  Concession cancelled 
2 D47 Motorway,  Czech Republic  Concession cancelled 
3 Horgos-Pozega Highway, Serbia Concession cancelled 
4 M9 Motorway, Pakistan Concession cancelled 
5 Mexico Toll Road Program, Mexico Concession cancelled 
6 Mumbasa container terminal, Kenya  Concession cancelled 
7 Trakia Motorway Project, Bulgaria Concession cancelled 
8 Transgabonais, Gabon Concession cancelled 
9 Jakarta Outer Ring Road, Indonesia Concession cancelled + Project nationalization 
10 Bangkok Elevated Road and Track System, Thailand Concession cancelled 
11 D5 Motorway, Czech Republic Concession tender cancelled 
12 M3/M30 Toll Road, Hungry Concession tender cancelled 
13 M7 Toll Road, Hungary Concession tender cancelled 
14 M9 Danube Toll Bridge at Szekszárd, Hungry Concession tender cancelled 
15 Pitesti-Bucharest-Lehliu (140 km) First Phase, Romania Concession tender cancelled 
16 Argentina Toll road program (first generation), Argentina  Contract suspension 
17 Beiras Litoral / Alta Shadow Toll Road, Portugal Project Halted 
18 91Express Lanes California, Unites States of America Project nationalization 
19 Camino Colombia Toll Road, Unites States of America Project nationalization 
20 London Underground – Metronet, United Kingdom  Project nationalization 
21 London Underground - Tubelines, United Kingdom Project nationalization 
22 M1/M15 Toll Road, Hungry Project nationalization 
23 Railtrack,United Kingdom  Project nationalization 
24 Siza Rail, Democratic Republic of Congo Project nationalization 
25 Skye bridge, United Kingdom  Project nationalization 
26 Tha Ngone bridge project, Lao PDR Project Nationalization 
27 Zagreb-Gorican Motorway, Crotia Project nationalization 
28 Channel Tunnel, United Kingdom Value for Money not achieved 
29 Channel Tunnel Rail Ling (CTRL), United Kingdom  Value for Money not achieved 
30 Confederation Bridge, Canada Value for Money not achieved 
31 Highway 407, Canada Value for Money not achieved 
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32 Railfreight Distribution, United Kingdom Value for Money not achieved 
33 Rolling Stock Leasing Companies (ROSCO), United Kingdom Value for Money not achieved 
34 Royal Dockyards (at Davenport and Rosyth), United Kingdom  Value for Money not achieved 
35 Wijkertunnel Randstad, Netherlands Value for Money not achieved 
 
 
4.0 IDENTIFICATION OF POTENTIAL FAILURE REASONS 
 
Throughout the case studies analysis it has been evident that neither one factor nor event 
leads towards success or failure. There has to be a series of simultaneous and/or consequent 
events and reasons that ultimately result in a situation of success or failure. Therefore, finding 
such events and reasons is necessary to understand failure phenomena in transportation PPPs.  
 
 
5.0 ANALYSIS OF OBSERVED FAILURES 
 
5.1. SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
 
The African continent is the least developed compared to other global regions, and in dire 
need to develop infrastructure to uplift the economic situation and alleviate poverty. African 
governments do not possess the massive financial resources required to renew and expand their 
infrastructure networks. Twenty percent of the total road network in Sub-Saharan Africa is paved, 
compared to twenty five percent in Latin America and over forty percent in South Asia [8]. 
Contrary to the utmost requirements, much less private investment in the past was made in Sub-
Saharan countries. Between 1990 and 2009, Sub-Saharan countries attracted US$95.04 billion in 
investment commitments. This amount represents only 7.87% of the cumulative investment in 
developing countries during same time period. The share of the transport sector was US$ 11.81 
billion; out of this 21.1% went to toll roads, 40.3% to railroads, 4.2% to Airports and 34.3% to 
Seaports. Most of this private sector involvement was limited to operating contracts yielding no 
equity investment [9].   
The political risks were found more active compared to other typical PPP risks. In African 
countries, traditional political risks such as nationalization of PPP/private projects either still 
persists or in decline; however, recently, problems for projects are from range of sub-state and 
transitional actors [10]. The failure of Transgabonais railway PPP at Gabon was mainly followed 
by those transnational and sub state actors. The Transgabonais carried both general freight and 
passengers. However, its primary traffics (also a main source of revenue) were manganese ore (65 
percent) which were mined by Comilog, a consortium 70% owned by the French private investor 
and 30% by the Gabon state. The very first fault in privatizing Transgabonias was that the public 
officials were unable to organize a competitive bid competition. There were only two bidders to 
bid for the project [11]; one was Transgabonais, a consortium led by the Gabonese National 
Timber Company, the main shipper of timber products, while the second (Gabonrail) was led by 
Comilog. This situation, together with the condition that the selected bidder should have to reach 
agreement on access charges with the rival bidder was a potential problem. In the end, Comilog 
decided not to submit a financial offer; i.e. withdrawing from the bid competition. Being an old 
business entity, Comilog was in a strong position to negotiate the realistic access charges. 
Moreover, Comilog also had strong political links due to the fact that it was co-owned by the state 
[11]. Besides conflict with the main customer, Transgabonais also faced a financing problem, and 
hence was not able to make promised investments in existing infrastructure and rolling stock [12]. 
The same was stated as the reason for terminating the concession. Quite similar problems were 
observed in Sizarail at Congo. The difference was that political problems were triggered by an 
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invocation of civil war; and the new governing alliance showed a negative attitude towards 
privatization and laterally cancelled the contract [11]. 
The transportation PPPs failures at Sub–Saharan Africa were majorly influenced by 
political conflicts, anti privatization attitude by the public sector officials and lower institutional 
capacity of public sector officials to establish efficient partnerships with private sector. The 
analysis of sample cases indicates that political and bureaucratic risks have catastrophe 
consequences over transportation PPPs; especially when public institutions have lower capacity to 
accommodate private activities in a public sector business. The case of Transgabonias also 
indicates the potential problems arising if one of the main customers has very strong market 
power and political links, with weak or no countervailing regulatory power. Therefore, based on 
identified evidences it could be concluded that Sub-Saharan African countries need well defined 
policies, strong regulators and capable public sector officials to successfully implement 




According to Private Participation for Infrastructure (PPI) database, From 1990 to 2009, the 
Asian share for transportation PPPs was 45.05% among global total in the same sector; i.e., the 
largest share compared to other regions defined above In Asian region, 53% of total transportation 
investment was made for greenfield projects. This appetite of greenfield projects indicates the 
shortage and need of new transportation infrastructure in Asian region. A study conducted by 
Asian Development Bank (ADB), Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) and World 
Bank estimated that infrastructure investment in 21 developing countries in east Asian countries 
would reach $200 billion per year over the next five years; and private sector was recognized as a 
potential financing source for meeting the need of Asian developing nations [13]. The need of 
private sector participation is also indispensible due to facts that low economic conditions left 
governments with very limited choice and tightly allocated budget for new and improved 
transportation infrastructure. Most Asian countries lie in low and middle income countries. The 
low income status compelled Asian governments to spend more on other basic needs like health 
and education, thus leaving very limited quota for development of new transportation 
infrastructure. Most of the time, Asian governments hardly suffice the operational cost for 
existing transportation infrastructure; and no maintenance is performed for a very long time. 
Therefore, in Asia a huge lag of infrastructure maintenance is present, which also itself restrict 
governments to undertake new infrastructure developments. That is the reason for appetite for 
greenfield projects via private finance in Asian countries.  
Asia, being a continent of developing nations, contains many problematic issues along with 
brilliant opportunities for the private sector. In our sampled case studies, the main issues were 
“lack of capacity in public sector” dealing PPP projects and “political and bureaucratic conflicts”. 
Due to the lack of capacity in dealing with PPP projects, the public sector was unable to organize 
a firm bid competition. Among four sampled projects, three projects witnessed non competitive 
tendering and in two projects the same led to the selection of unsuitable concessionaires. Apart 
from non competitive tendering, incorrect technical assessment prior to issuing bid documents, 
weak scrutiny and selection procedures and ineffective project monitoring were the identified 
indicators in sampled projects reflecting lack of capacity in public sector agencies of Asian 
countries. 
The Asian category in the sampled projects contains four projects, representing four 
different failure scenarios. The Bangkok Elevated Road and Track System (BERTS) was a 
greenfield project suffered since the award of the project. The concession was awarded without 
competitive tendering and conducting any feasibility studies. The concessionaire also did not 
consider it necessary to conduct any technical and feasibility studies and started construction 
work right away [14, 55]. The project was severely affected due to the non-availability of 
feasibility assessment, baffled progress, non- securing of right of way, and poor coordination with 
another parallel project. Another concession for a greenfield project of Don Muang tollway was 
awarded to a different company in almost similar time as BERTS. The construction of Don 
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Muang tollway was completed before BERTS and constructed flyover for cross street 
intersections in such a way to make it difficult for BERTS project to proceed, as large parts of 
both projects were situated side by side [14]. Besides Don Mung tollway project, BERTS also had 
interfacing and site handover issues with Bangkok Skytrain project which had many stations 
positioned directly across the BERTS main route [15]. These all contribute BERTS with a 
progress slower than the planned schedule. Only 13% of the work was completed in the total 
stipulated construction time. Apart from these mentioned factors, the role of public sector was 
also questionable in terms of their support to sort out solutions for project problems. The case 
study of BERTS revels that the synchronization between public and private partners, that 
synergizes the motivation and leads towards project success, could not be established since the 
start of project. This factor was highly attributed to the rapid change of public officials 
responsible for project monitoring. Moreover, case study also identified that public sector officials 
did not contributed for project problem solutions, rather the concessionaire was continuously 
threatened to terminate the concession.  
As discussed above, being a continent of developing nations Aisa dominates in certain 
kinds of risks. Norton Rose, an international law firm, surveyed Asian countries for potential risks 
in transportation PPPs and came up with a conclusion that the volume of opportunities in a 
country tends to be highly correlated to the degree of political risk in that country [16]. This 
conclusion was found evident in sampled projects at Pakistan and Indonesia. In Pakistan, the M9 
motorway project was troubled massively between central and provincial governments over 
motorway land ownership and its privatization. In Pakistan, the motorways are being operated 
under a federal government agency named National Highway’s Authority (NHA). The M9 
motorway is also owned and operated by NHA. The proposed M9 motorway concession was 
passing through a major provincial industrial zone; and M9 was the only way through which one 
can reach that industrial zone. Therefore, provincial government showed their concerns over 
foreign ownership of only available route to major provincial industrial zone. Following conflict 
of interest between federal and provincial governments the concession was terminated. In an 
interview with a NHA official, it was also disclosed that the concession was awarded without any 
competitive tendering and the cancellation of the concession was also due to the concessionaire’s 
inability to acquire finance for project. 
The Jakarta Outer Ring Road (JORR) was most remarkable evidence of political and 
bureaucratic conflicts. The project was first impacted by the Asian financial crises of 1997 and 
consequently the concessionaires were unable to repay the debt. The concessionaires then 
surrendered the project to Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) in exchange of bad 
debts of project company. IBRA and State highway agency of Indonesia then established a new 
company under the name PT Jalantol Lingkar Luar Jakarta (JLJ) to take care of the toll road 
project and take responsibility for settling its debts to IBRA [17]. Finding a strategic partner who 
could also finance the project was a priority of newly established company. A few attempts of 
rebidding were organized but selection of new partner could not be accomplished. In 2001, IBRA 
announced that a consortium company, DRBHICOM from Malaysia, had been selected as the 
preferred bidder for JORR [18]. However, in the same year, Parliament requested that the JORR 
project be retendered. The demand of retendering could be attributed to allegations of bribery in 
the selection of the preferred bidder. Soon after parliament’s demand, the Malaysian Consortium 
had stated that it spent US$3 million on Indonesian senior officials to win the JORR project [17]. 
It became even more complex when conflicting views between two Ministers representing Jasa 
Marga and State Own Enterprises came to the surface, who felt that Malaysian consortium should 
take part in the JORR project (Tempo 2002). In a legal opinion in 2002 from the Attorney General 
ruled out that the Malaysian consortium did not have a right anymore over the JORR project [18]. 
Thus the private sector partner could not be selected and the project was completed by state 
owned company.  
Ref [16] identified demand risk on a top ranking in Asian toll roads. This risk was 
witnessed in Tha Ngone bridge project in Laos where it failed to meet minimum demand 
requirements. The project concession was awarded to an Australian company without any 
competitive tendering. In spite of replacing existing ferry service [19], the project was unable to 
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attract sufficient demand. The tolls were increased to the point unaffordable to many users and 
eventually government decided to buy back the bridge.   
The four sampled failure cases reflect the lower institutional capacity of public sector 
officials to sort out better PPP deals. The failures of M9 motorway in Pakistan and JORR in 
Indonesia showed that public sector officials were first unable to identify the potential private 
partners and then political and bureaucratic conflicts severely distressed the project progress. The 
bribery issues also highlighted both of the cases. The case of study of BERTS also showed similar 
problems at the public sector’s end; however the role of public sector is more questionable in this 
case. Fundamentally, the failure of BERTS was affected by the unforeseen factors which 
theoretically could be envisaged before the award of concession by conducting detailed feasibility 
study. Thai government initiated BERTS with another PPP project at the same time in same 
corridor, which created massive site interfacing problems. When problems started surfacing, 
instead of solving the problems the Thai public sector officials were reluctant to take part and 
international concessionaire was left alone to sort out the solutions. In spite of massive problems, 
it was quite possible for BERTS to be successful, if proper actions would have been taken at early 
stages by the public sector officials such as aiding the concessionaire with securing right of way 





Transportation PPPs at Canada have shown better outcomes compared to other regions. 
Both sampled case study projects from Canada are functioning, however their success in terms of 
delivering value for money (VFM) to the public is being debated and questionable. In our case 
studies, we have considered Canada different from the USA, as legal and regulatory system 
concerning PPP in Canada is much different. The PPP regulatory system in Canada is more 
similar to the Britain and Australia. For example, the USA doesn’t follow strict public sector 
comparator (PSC) or value for money test procedures while Canadian PPP council describes a 
proper PSC procedure much more similar to Australian PSC practice. However, Canada does 
have acquired some American influence in Highways privatization. The privatization of Highway 
407 under franchise of 99 year lease resembles to the sale of Chicago Skyway and Indiana toll 
way in the USA. Alike in the USA, the sale of Highway 407 was also opposed by many public 
organizations [20] but the Canadian government had a valid reason, to satisfy the parliament. The 
highway privatization was made politically favorable on the grounds to cover budget deficits and 
support weak financial position of the Ontario province due to recent financial crises [21]. The 
lease was awarded in $3.1 billion. In exchange, the Ontario government gave away toll settings 
and collection rights for Highway 407 [20].  
Since privatization of Highway 407 in 1999, the tolls have been raised six times. This 
action of concessionaire caused congestion on adjacent roads. To overcome this, the government 
took legal action claiming that concessionaire breached the contract by not getting approval of toll 
increase from government. Nevertheless, the court decision went in favor of concessionaire. After 
failed attempt of legal action, the government approached concessionaire with $40 million 
“customer benefit” program, which was agreed by the concessionaire. According to this customer 
relief program, the tolls would be reduced up to 15 percent for 100,000 frequent users over the 
following four years and discounts were provided for truck drivers during evenings and weekends 
[21, 53].  
Originally, Highway 407 was constructed through conventional (i.e. Design-Bid-Build) 
procurement, thus financial risks were born by the public sector. The highway was privatized 
soon after it became operational. In privatizing Highway 407, the Ontario provincial government 
moved faster and the long term public benefits were not kept in view. After two and a half years 
of privatization, Highway 407 was sold again in 6.3 million, double the original price paid to the 
government [21]. If government could have waited enough so the project could have reached a 
mature level to determine the correct market price the public could have more benefits. Moreover, 
shifting toll pricing power to the concessionaire impacted VFM. The 40 million customer benefit 
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program allows concessionaire to raise tolls once regular user rebate program takes place. In 
overall experience, the privatization of Highway 407 did not bring VFM to the public. Highway 
was sold at premature stage, yielding less financial benefits; and government lost its control on 
toll settings. 
Another Canadian transportation PPP was Confederation Bridge connecting Prince Edward 
Island with Canadian mainland. Confederation Bridge PPP deal also demonstrated lapses in 
achieving planned VFM. The factors undermining anticipated VMF included the higher tolls, 
expensive financing costs, improper risk allocation and improper financial subsidy evaluations in 
Public Sector Comparator (PSC) calculations. Before construction of Confederation Bridge, the 
Prince Edward Island was connected through ferry service which was discontinued after the 
bridge became operational. The ferry service was subsidized by the government. The same 
amount of subsidy was given to the bridge concessionaire to subsidize the bridge tolls. The 
government also allowed concessionaire to increase the tolls (above the ferry charges) as much as 
$8 per car [22]. The Auditor General of Canada (1999) found that ferry subsidy was not properly 
accounted in the PSC of project, and financing arrangement cost $45 million more than it should 
have. Moreover the demand risk was also borne by the public by providing minimum revenue 




5.4. CENTER EASTERN EUROPEANAND OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
 
Center Eastern European (CEE) contributes major part of our samples of case studies, i.e. 
13 projects. However, higher quantity of failure projects doesn’t indicate these regions are not 
viable for transportation PPPs. CEE countries also had many successful examples of private 
participation in developing transportation infrastructures. The samples from CEE countries 
included in this study represent the projects undertaken in early 1990’s, the time soon after the fall 
of the Soviet Union. During Soviet era, Central European countries were under the influence of 
communism. After the fall of communism at the beginning of 1990’s, CEE countries began the 
process of transition to the market economies [23], that is, from communism to capitalism. The 
change to capitalism was immense to cater rapid economic growth and get synchronized with 
other central European countries. Soon after the fall of communism, the rapid growth was 
observed in transportation activities. The growth was evident by increase in the number of cars 
and trucks in CEE countries increased by 30% and 43% between 1993 and 1999 respectively 
(United Nations Economic Commission for European Database). The growth of transportation 
activities can be attributed to two main factors. First, the geographic position of CEE countries 
occupies the position of through-transit with in European transportation networks. Second, cross 
border traffic was very much restricted during Soviet era among CEE countries and other 
European countries. Soon after the fall of communism in early 1990’s, the trade and other 
economic activities were increased on higher rate compared to pre 1990’s.  
Faced with pressing needs, CEE countries urgently needed to expand their transportation 
networks. As these countries were recently liberated from a bounded economic system, the 
financing constraint did not let them perform the transport network expansion from public money. 
The new transportation infrastructure investment plans by the CEE countries had to rely on 
private finance. Besides shortage of public funding, other main reasons for utilizing private 
finance were (1) the need to reduce both public deficit and debt in order to meet requirements for 
admission to the European Union and (2) the aim of increasing the role of the private sector in the 
economy [24].  
The early transportation PPP failures at CEE and other European countries highlighted 
some key failure reasons. Among many failure reasons, non competitive tendering, lower 
feasibility for privatization and demands of higher subsides by preferred bidders and 
concessionaires are the most significant. Non competitive tendering and lower feasibility for 
privatization are the initiating reasons to trigger other failure reasons. The demand of higher 
subsidies by the concessionaire is a dependent reason majorly preceded by the non competitive 
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tendering and lower feasibility for privatization. Non-competitive tendering put selected 
concessionaire in a stronger position to negotiate for higher subsidies and other demands. This 
superiority of concessionaire was evident in PPP projects of D47 Motorway at Czech Republic 
[25], Pitesti-Bucharest-Lehliu Highway at Romania [23, 26] and Trakia motorway at Bulgaria [23, 
25, 27]. In the case of Horgos-Pozega highway project, lower feasibility for privatization was also 
a reason for demand of higher subsidies by the concessionaire [27].  
Lower feasibility of project for privatization was mainly due to the lower traffic demand on 
project corridors. The projects failed (i.e. concession tender cancelled) because of lower 
feasibility were D5 motorway in Czech Republic, Horgos-Pozega Highway in Serbia, and 
M3/M30 Toll Road, M7 Toll Road and Danube Toll Bridge in Hungary. The lower traffic 
demand in Hungary could be attributed to very high inflation rates and decline in real incomes 
during the early and mid 1990’s [28]. The high inflation and decline in income resulted in 
decrease in economic activities and also in affordability of general public. Though at the same 
time, two highway projects, M1/M15 motorway and M5 motorway were successfully procured 
and completed due to the fact that they were providing through-transit to the international traffic 
between Central Europe via Austria and Southern Europe via Serbia. The M1/M15 motorway 
project was nationalized after 5 years of operation [29]. 
Where non-competitive tendering made concessionaires demand for higher subsidies, it also 
resulted in selection of unsuitable concessionaires (e.g. Belgrade Novisad Motorway in Czech 
Republic and Zagreb-Gorican Motorway in Crotia). The Belgrade Novisad motorway was greatly 
suffered by the baffled project progress as only 10–15% of the originally planned works were 
carried out during the total planned construction time of 23 months [23]. Consequently, the 
concession was cancelled without paying any compensation and the project was completed from 
public funds.  
Public protests were also observed in response to the non-competitive tendering in the case 
of D47 motorway in Czech Republic (McGrath et al. 2008). The toll charges were usually much 
higher than the affordability of general public. It was the similar case in M1/M15 toll road in 
Hungary, in which the concession agreement gave the concessionaire the right to adjust toll rates 
according to consumer price index and fluctuations in exchange rate based on the original 
proportions of different currencies used for the loans [23]. The revenue maximization policy by 
the concessionaire was based on the fact that there would be only one toll barrier between 
Austria-Hungary border and Budapest [30]. The revenue maximization policy was also based on 
the assumption that rich western European drivers would be prepared to pay a higher per 
kilometer toll than those applied in West European countries if calculated on the basis of the 
length of motorway. The traffic studies confirmed that mainly foreigners would use the motorway 
[29]. However enforced toll rates were deterrent to most of Hungarian drivers due to the lower 
affordability of Hungarian public. This resulted in strong public oppositions and legal petitions 
against concessionaire. The court procedure led indirectly to the capping of the toll tariffs [49]. 
Civil court ruled that according to the Civil Code the toll rates were unfair and extremely high, 
and that therefore the concessionaire had to pay back the excessive part of the toll [50]. The 
“excessive part of toll”, as per court decision, amounted one third of total collected toll since start 
of concession [30]. This was not just an end, the project greatly suffered from less revenue 
generation due to court decision and lower traffic demand followed by economic crises in 
Hungary and increase of other attractions in other parts of Europe which diverted international 
traffic. Less revenue generation affected loan repayment and hence created distrust in project 
financers, while on the other hand public protests undermined the political support. This all led 
towards project nationalization. 
The traffic lower than expectations at M1/M15 was not purely due to the economic crises. 
The basis of this fault lied in the unrealistic traffic predictions made based on pre-1989 partial 
historical data when international traffic between Hungary and Eastern Europe was severely 
restricted. The rapid growth of traffic on route during 1992 and 1993 strengthened the traffic 
increase predictions by the experts. The experts appointed by the lenders also agreed on 
aforementioned predictions during due diligence. Nevertheless experts were unable to realize that 
increased traffic volume was majorly contributed by the Hungarian drivers traveled to Austria to 
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buy stuff not available in Hungary, which would stopped once after conditions get better in 
Hungary (be reminded that Hungary was a part of the communist bloc until 1989. After the fall of 
communist bloc in the early1990’s, the Hungarian economy was in transition). Another wrong 
speculation was made about the holiday traffic from former East Germany. At this point traffic 
experts were also failed to envisage that improvement in German GDP would also make other 
destination more affordable for Germans [30]. 
Apart from above mentioned failure reasons, there are some other observed faults. In 
Wijkertunnel in Netherlands, the improper benchmarking performed by the public sector resulted 
in ineffective risk transfer and ultimately substantial cost to tax payers [31]. The project partly 
transferred design and construction risk to the private party and demand risk was borne by the 
public party, which provided minimum traffic guarantee and capped maximum revenues. This 
non-effective risk transfer could be partially attributed to the lack of competition during the 
tendering process, as there was only one bidder for the project.  
 
 
5.5. UNITED KINGDOM 
 
In the UK, PPPs are also known as Private Finance Initiative (PFI). The PFI program was 
initiated in 1992 by the Conservatives’ government of John Major [32]. The nature of the PFI 
program differs from typical PPPs in other countries. The aim of PFI is to bring the private 
sector’s finance, management skills, and expertise into the provision of public sector facilities and 
services [33]. The other forms of PPPs focus on private sector ownership of state owned public 
infrastructure and services. In spite of a developed economy of the UK with fully capable public 
sector agencies, the early transportation PFI experience had witnessed problems associated with 
delivering anticipated value. In the total nine sampled projects from the UK, three were bought 
back by the government. The other six projects are still running under private provision but were 
declared a bad deal by the Auditor General as they were unable to produce the value for tax 
payers.  
The world’s oldest underground railway, “London Underground”, was partially privatized 
in 2002 in such a way that track maintenance, rehabilitation and upgrading of lines were 
outsourced under two concessions named Metronet and Tublines respectively. The asset 
ownership and operations were remained under the public sector agency named “Transport for 
London (TFL)”. Metronet was responsible for a majority of lines except for the Jubilee Line, 
Northern Line and Piccadilly Line, which came under Tublines’s concession. Since the start of 
project, Metronet somehow was not able to keep the pace with operational requirements of TFL. 
Ref [34] identified poor governance as the main reason driving Metronet slow in progress. In 
Metronet’s organizational structure, many decisions were needed to be agreed by five 
shareholders. All these shareholders also acted as Metronet’s suppliers. They had different 
motivations depending on their supplier roles. The executive management changed frequently and 
therefore was unable to manage the work of its shareholder dominated supply chain effectively. 
Being responsible for both maintenance and supplies, Metronet had power over some scope of 
work expected to be paid for extra work undertaken and had better access to cost information then 
the management. Ref [34] also found that Metronet was unable to provide adequate evidence to 
support claims to have performed work economically and efficiently. Due to organizational flaws, 
Metronet had problems in delivering its capital works program on time and within the costs bid.  
The public sector client was not satisfied with the quality or timeliness of information that 
was emerging from Metronet, and thus was not agreeing with work charge demanded by Metronet. 
This conflict of trust led both partners to the arbitration and later to the transfer of Metronet under 
public ownership. However, the performance of Tubelines remained better than Metronet. 
Affected by Metronet’s commercial tactics, the public sector client doubted the quantity of work 
charges demanded by the Tubleliens. This matter also went under arbitration and won by Tublines 
[48]. The arbitrator ruled out that either London Underground should pay Tublines the demanded 
charges or decrease the amount of work. Instead of following these two alternatives, the public 
sector client chose to buyout Tubelines, and thus Tublelines was also transferred under public 
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provision. The London Underground PPPs went fail majorly due to lack of capacity of corporate 
governance in Metronet concessionaire while Tubeliens was just a consequence of lack of trust by 
the public sector client. If Metronet shareholders could have bring balance to their simultaneous 
roles of supplier and concessionaire, the results would have been different. The rapid change in 
management officials at Meteronet was also the reason lapsing in corporate governance which 
causes misconducts in operations and increased the client’s distrust on concessionaire. 
The PFI deal of Railtrack was another example of poor governance by the concessionaire. 
Unlike London Underground, the poor governance of Railtrack cost a lot to the public and users 
directly. Soon after privatization, the Railtrack was criticized for continuing bad performance in 
operations and safety standards. The Railtrack customers and other freight train operators, who 
used the same railway network, were desperate for regulatory action to be taken to improve 
performance and railway network [35]. Consequently, only after two years of privatization 
Railtrack began to receive castigate from government for its failure to perform as per required 
standards [36]. The fatal train crash of Hartsfield on October 17, 2000, in which four people killed 
and thirty four injured, raised more protests and concerns against Railtrack. Finally in 2003 
Railtrack was nationalized preceded by the concessionaire’s insolvency. 
Among cancelled PFI projects, the Skye Bridge concession project was solely cancelled 
due to massive public opposition. Sky Bridge was constructed under 33 years of concession in 
1995, to connect island of Skye with Scottish mainland. Since start of operations, the Skye Bridge 
remained controversial for its toll charges. Despite of subsidizing by the Scottish government, it 
cost residents £5.70 one way for a car - the highest levy of its kind in Europe [37]. The higher 
tolls were continuously protested by the users and anti toll campaign ran by the island residents. A 
toll-collector interviewed by the BBC in 2005 said that abuse of collectors by motorists had been 
commonplace. Many passengers were cited for refusing to pay toll, with around 500 being 
arrested and 130 subsequently convicted for nonpayment [37]. These protests were continued 
until 2004 when Scottish government announced to buy back the bridge and consequently 
abolishment of tolls.  
Some early transportation PFI deals had proven to be not delivering value as planned. 
Among sampled projects in the UK, six projects were not able to deliver anticipated results. The 
case studies of the six projects reveal that public sector officials were unable to predict future 
traffic demand and to perform comprehensive economic and financial assessment. The PFI 
projects of Railfreight Distribution, ROSCO and Royal Dockyards (at Davenport and Rosyth) 
may be mainly highlighted for such poor practice by the public sector. The Auditor general of UK  
for the sale of Railfreight Distribution [51] identified that the public sector had relied on single 
point values and subjective assessment of risk rather than performing detailed uncertainty analysis 
for all available alternatives to the privatization. The sale of Royal Dockyards (at Davenport and 
Rosyth) is almost a similar case to that of Railfreight Distribution. The Roayal Dockyard deal 
proceedings represented a significant discount (56% discount at Devonport, and 36% at Rosyth) 
on public sector official’s own valuations of the business [38]. The concerned public sector 
agency argued that the sales would help to cater substantially lower refit prices at docks. However, 
financial forecasting was quite uncertain as they were based on hypothetical comparison of the 
future cost of an illustrative program of refit work. Furthermore, both PFI deals were also headed 
by the unhealthy competitive tendering. In the sale of ROSCO (Rolling Stock Leasing 
Companies), the public sector officials were unable to estimate market prevailing price of asset 
and therefore the assets were sold in lower price. The ROSCO sale took place in February 1996 
for a gross price of £1.8 billion under three different sales. By December 1997, all three 
businesses were sold by initial purchasers for a total price of £2.7 billion [34]..  
The greenfield project of Channel Tunnel and its associated project channel Tunnel Rail 
Link (CTRL) also suffered in capturing required demand. Ref [39] identified that Eurotunnel’s 
forecasts were extremely optimistic, forecasting between 2 and 3 times the current numbers of 
passengers. The traffic demand lower than expected was actually due to improper forecasting by 
consultants hired by the concessionaire. The consultants and commercial department of the 
concessionaire tended to concentrate on wrong issues, i.e., the prospects for economic growth and 
the size of the total market, rather than Eurotunnel’s likely share of market and the effect of 
International Journal of Sustainable Construction Engineering & Technology (ISSN: 2180-3242)  
Vol 2, Issue 2, December 2011 
 
Published by:Universiti Tun Hussein Onn Malaysia (UTHM) and Concrete Society of Malaysia (CSM) 74 
http://penerbit.uthm.edu.my/ojs/index.php/IJSCET 
 
competition from the ferries on prices. Eurotunnel did not properly understand the economics of 
its competitors, the ferries, and their potential to cut their prices by large amounts and still remain 
profitable. Later, the calculations by [40] showed that the ferries were able to break even with an 
average load factor of only 30% at the low price levels which were prevailing then in 1995; thus, 
any additional traffic above this level provided profit contribution. These factors left channel 
tunnel with least ability to compete in market. Apart from improper traffic predictions, the tunnel 
suffered problems since the start of operations. After the Tunnel was opened in 1994, it was found 
that many aspects of the project design were not suitable for the operating business. Eurotunnel’s 
TUGO ticketing system and toll booths did not easily allow price differentiation between different 
groups of passengers. Eurotunnel soon realized that this was a fatal flaw and intended to introduce 
new ticketing and pre-booking systems; but this took sufficient time. Other problems existed in 
the Tunnel environment due to dust, salinity, humidity, water seepage and high temperatures, 
which caused failures to the signaling system and electrical supplies [40]. Besides these problems, 
the tunnel experienced three fire incidents that were significant enough to close the tunnel [50]. 
The sister project of channel tunnel, Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL) also suffered through less 
demand and consequently less revenue generation. Finally, the project was sold in 2010 to a 
Canadian consortium under a 30-year concession. 
In analyzing the UK’s transportation PFI’s, it was disclosed that early projects were 
affected by pre-bid and improper financial and economic assessments by both public sector 
officials and prospect bidders. Often these assessments were also accompanied by unrealistic 
traffic demand predictions. This was the case in Channel tunnel and its rail link, which 
consequently resulted in Channel Tunnel Rail link’s concessionaire’s insolvency [54]. However, 
in the case of channel tunnel concessionaire’s insolvency, it was secured by restructuring and 
writing off the debt [40]. Apart from unrealistic traffic predictions, the poor governance and 
ineffective commercial strategies also caused the concessionaire’s insolvency.   
 
 
5.6. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
Private sector had been playing important role in providing transportation infrastructure in 
USA since very long during past decades. The private turnpikes (In USA, the private toll road 
is known as Turnpike) were common throughout the 19th century [41] with construction of 
public toll roads and bridges until half of 20th century. In 1950, the tradition shift was observed 
with the development of federal funded interstate highway system and consequently toll roads 
were largely superseded by public sector funding [41]. In USA, the most of public sector funding 
for highways comes from dedicated fuel and vehicle taxes; and tolls were forbidden on federal 
highways except on some bridges and tunnels. However, in late 20th century the federal tax 
revenues were unable to keep pace with growth in demand for new highways. To cover such 
financial deficits, in 1991 the USA government passed Intermodal Surface Transportation 
Efficiency Act (ISTEA). The ISTEA enabled state governments to utilize federal funding for non 
interstate toll roads in conjunction with state or private sector funding. To further facilitate private 
participation in public infrastructure the National Highway Designation Act was passed in 1995. 
Under this act state infrastructure banks could be established to leverage federal funding, inter alia, 
for privately financed projects. In 1998, the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation 
Act (TIFIA) passed to support private sector to bring forward more innovative ways to finance 
transportation projects. The TIFIA also encourages the use of private sector financing for the 
transportation projects exceeding US$100 million, offering direct federal loans and guarantees 
covering up to 33% of project cost [41].  
Since 2004, the behavioral shifts in USA transportation markets have been observed by 
privatizing existing public toll roads under fixed term franchises. The privatization of existing 
public toll roads reflected a different prospect of PPPs than in any developing countries. In 
developing countries, the PPPs in transportation are to develop the new infrastructure, while 
privatizing existing public toll roads are meant to produce funds for general public sector budget. 
Such privatizations of existing toll roads, have witnessed longer terms compared to the typical 
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types of PPPs in other countries. For example the Indiana Toll way and Chicago Skyway were 
sold to private entities under fixed terms of 75 and 99 years respectively. The practice of 
franchising already built and publicly owned highways was condemned by many public 
organizations [42]; however this kind of sells also had increase trust of private sector in American 
transportation markets and new deals for greenfiled projects are underway.  
In sampled projects from USA, the SR91 Express Lanes were the first congestion pricing 
(the peak/off peak pricing) implemented toll road. During the first few years of operations many 
users viewed the project as a public benefit and supported congestion pricing [43]. However, after 
5 years of project completion the peak time usage dropped to 43% [44]. The reduction of express 
lanes usage resulted in dual faced consequences. First, the congestion on free lanes increased to 
double. Second, to cover the loss the concessionaire started charging high occupancy vehicles a 
50% of reported toll which was against the tolling criteria described in contract agreement. The 
increase in peak time traffic on free lanes gave rise to safety issues and urges CALTRANS 
(California Transport), the public agency, to expand the capacity of free lanes. The concessionaire 
did not accept the safety evaluations made by the public sector agencies and considered the 
expansion plans an attack on the commercial viability of the project. The concessionaire claimed 
its right of “non competition” under concession agreement, and rejected the public sector partner 
claim that safety issues can override the non competence clause [45]. The conflict between public 
and private partner couldn’t solved until concessionaire filled a legal petition against expansion 
plans. The court decision went in favor of concessionaire and public sector had no choice but to 
buy back the express lanes. The case of SR 91 Expressway showed that public sector’s failure to 
develop clear and rigors contract clauses could provide unfair rights to the concessionaire in the 
context to social justice and loss of value to the public. 
The second sampled project, Comino Colombia Toll Road (CCTR), represented two unique 
risks not witnessed in any other sampled project. The project was originally planned to aid the 
international traffic from Mexico to provide by pass from city of Laredo. Soon after the opening, 
the toll road was unable to attract the required traffic. The less traffic was largely due to the 
continuation of government policies of restricting Mexican traffic, especially trucks to move 
freely inside USA [46]. The other reason of less traffic was construction of a new bridge over 
American - Mexican border which took most of the targeted traffic. The new bridge sized four 
fifth of the truck traffic of three cross border bridges that take trucks from Mexico; and truck 
traffic near the CCTR dropped from 5,000 a day to 1300 [46]. The prohibition of Mexican trucks 
movement on USA soils made unloading all loads in shipment yards on US-Mexican border and 
their US counterpart to carry these loads to the destinations. These US counterpart’s drivers prefer 
to be closer in where the truckstops and motels are concentrated even if it is a few miles more [46]. 
Followed by lower traffic, Just after three years of toll road opening in 2003 the project was 
foreclosed by the lenders; and ultimately bought back by the public sector. In this way, the two 
indirect actions of government (i.e. traffic restriction policy and construction of new bridge) 
resulted in failure of a Highway PPP project.  
 
 
5.7. LATIN AMERICA 
 
The highway privatization in Latin America was initiated in 1990a. The infrastructure 
deficit, combined with chronic budgetary problems, led governments to clinch private finance to 
fill budgetary gaps and also to accelerate the transportation infrastructure construction. However, 
the experiences from Colombia, Mexico and Argentina showed that anticipated results were not 
delivered. Ref [47] identified that that private financing of new highways freed up fewer public 
resources than expected because public funds were often diverted to bail out franchise holders. 
The early failures in Latin America can be attributed to the fact that privatization was initiated 
without developing any regulatory policies about them [47]. 
In Argentina, the first phase of toll road concession was planned in 1990; in which 12 year 
concessions for intercity roads were awarded. The concessions were mainly awarded to domestic 
private firms, having no experience in long term projects. The right to collect tolls was granted in 
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return for the responsibility of carrying out programs of maintenance, rehabilitation, and capacity 
improvements.  Some concessionaires were observed collecting toll without implementing any 
rehabilitation and maintenance works. Besides that location of toll booths were located in such a 
way to create captive traps for users. In February 1991, after only five months of operation, the 
Argentine government suspended the concession contracts. The main reasons were the complaints 
lodged by the users and changes in law of convertibility of local currency [47]. The changes in 
convertibility law in 1991 affected the contract escalation clauses in concession agreement. Later, 
the Argentinean government renegotiated the contracts on better terms.   
The example of Mexico toll road program was more devastating and left with many lessons 
for public sector involve with transportation PPPs. The Mexico toll road program was initiated in 
1989 with the intentions of doubling the national road network. However the observers rated 
Mexican program a hurry approach to acquire road infrastructure [48]. The very first mistake was 
made at initial stage of procurement by not adopting precise and well defined scrutiny and 
selection procedures. The prequalification process was not rigorous enough to screen out potential 
bidders. The concession award criterion limited the pool of potential candidates and made it 
limited to the local construction companies which were more interested in construction works 
than in long term financial viability of the project.  Debts were secured from local commercial 
banks which were not capable of providing long term financings and thus it resulted in high 
interest debt. Moreover, the local banks and concession awarding agencies were unable to 
perform a proper due diligence of bidders. 
The Mexican toll road program planned to establish five main road corridors three of which 
were to run between the main industrial centers in Mexico and the principal border crossings into 
the United States. However, some high priority segments were never concessioned, while others 
that were constructed lacked the contiguous sections that would integrate them into the network 
[48]. Therefore, attractiveness of toll roads to the long distance traffic was reduced and targeted 
traffic demand was not achieved. Besides adoption of improper intermodal strategy, the gross 
miscalculation of investment costs and operating income, improper project management and 
delayed acquisition of right of way led concessionaires to an unsustainable set of operating 
conditions. The situation was more saddled with the Mexican currency crises of December 1994. 
Thus, the combined impact of national and project level factors halted the development of all 
projects. The local commercial banks were unable to retrieve the issued loans and many 
concessionaires and their affiliates had no other way but to write off their equities. Finally 
government was left with only alternative to buy back the concessions. However, in both cases of 
Argentina and Mexico the second generation of toll roads was launched with more detailed 





The overall trends of failures are quite similar in all regions; i.e. that any specific failure 
reason has similar consequences irrespective of any geo-political boundaries. However, different 
regions vary in PPP adoption patterns and thus in failure patterns. A typical failure pattern 
illustrates dominance of particular reasons/events in particular regions. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
majorities of failures are due to the political and bureaucratic conflicts; thus require establishment 
of strong and independent regulatory authority to attract more private finance. The Asian region 
also dominates with political and bureaucratic conflicts but the non competitive tendering 
dominates mostly. The non competitive tendering and consequently selection of unsuitable 
concessionaire reflects the lack of capacity in public sector agencies of Asian region.  
The Canadian region illustrates the least potential failure reasons. However poor economic 
and financial assessment was highlighted in both sampled projects from Canada. The Canadian 
PPP project case studies showed that public officials were unable to make robust ex-ante 
evaluation of proposed PPP projects. It was the similar case in early PFI deals in United Kingdom. 
However, poor governance and adoption of non effective commercial strategies by the 
concessionaires also found responsible for partnership failures; e.g. Metronet, Railrack etc.  
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The cases from USA revealed unique types of transportation PPP risks, i.e. construction of 
new transport infrastructure and traffic movement restriction policies by the government. 
However, not many potential failure reasons were identified in case studies from USA. The less 
potential failure reasons in USA may be attributed to the fact that private toll roads exist there 
since 19th century, so users and public officials have longer experience of working together with 
private sector. The case from Latin American countries reflected entirely opposite picture as 
compare to USA.  
The early PPP attempts went brutally failed in Argentina and Mexico due to the fact that 
privatization was initiated with no prior preparations. Neither public sector agencies nor the local 
financial institutes were had potential to embrace highway privatizations. The case of Mexico toll 
road program showed that the decisions made by public sectors, from initial planning to the PPP 
highways operation, were flawed. Thou, the second generation of toll roads were launched with 
more rigors preparations. 
The failure patterns in CEE and other European countries revealed that many of PPP 
projects failed due to the lower feasibility for privatization of proposed project. It was identified 
that major potential failure reasons in CEE countries were due to the lack experience of public 
sector agencies. The lack of experience in public sector agencies could be attributed to their less 
interaction with long term private owned projects. The less interaction with private activity was 
due to the fact that many countries were part of communist bloc before 1989 when private 
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